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PROPOSED TREASURY REGULATION 1.861-8:
A SOLUTION TO THE SECTION 482 ROYALTY
PRICING PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN-BASED
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS?
In the last few years, there has been a substantial increase in the level
of foreign direct investment in the United States.' This increase is
significant because the United States, in dealing with the local opera-
tions of foreign-based multinational corporations, 2 must face fiscal
problems which heretofore have haunted only other nations that have
had to deal with U.S.-based multinationals:3 namely, the administrative
and statutory difficulties of taxing a local subsidiary on income that is
fairly attributable to its operations. This task is made all the more
difficult because multinationals have developed a variety of subtle
accounting methods for expatriating funds, apart from dividend pay-
ments to parent companies, with the result that the financial records of
their subsidiaries may show taxable income that has been artificially
adjusted downward. 4 One such method is to charge a subsidiary high
royalty fees in exchange for licenses granted by the parent.5 To
1. See note 16 infra and accompanying text for statistics on the increase in foreign
investment.
2. The U.S. operation of a foreign company might be either a branch of the foreign
corporation or a subsidiary. A branch is an office of a corporation incorporated under
the laws of a country other than the one in which the branch is located. A subsidiary is a
distinct corporation owned and controlled by a company organized under the laws of a
country other than the one in which the subsidiary is located. Authors quibble over
whether or not corporations with foreign branches are technically "multinational corpo-
rations." This Note will focus on subsidiaries of foreign-based companies, although part
of the analysis is applicable to branch operations as well. See note 73 infra.
3. A great deal has been written about the various problems created by multinational
corporations. See, e.g., J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1969); L.
TURNER, INVISIBLE EMPIRES (1971); L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE
THIRD WORLD (1973); R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1971). For a brief outline of
problems for the United States created by foreign-based multinationals, see Note, The
Rising Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater Violate U.S. Treaty Commitments?
72 MICH. L. REV. 551, 554-61 (1974).
4. See notes 20 and 28 infra and accompanying text.
5. For the purposes of this note, "royalties" are payments for intangible property
rights licensed to a recipient. The term "license" will be broadly defined to include the
granting of rights to use such intangibles as patents, trademarks, franchises, special
methods or processes, and copyrights. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(3) (1968), as amended,
T.D. 6964, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 203,-T.D. 6998, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 144, T.D. 7170,
1972-1 CuM. BULL. 178 for a comprehensive list of such intangibles.
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frustrate such attempts to avoid American taxation, the IRS will have to
scrutinize more closely the royalty fees charged to the U.S. subsidiaries
of foreign-based multinationals-a process which may require refining
current methods for doing so.
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code is the general statutory
solution to the problem of tax evasion through artificial transfer
pricing7 among related companies. This section gives the IRS the
authority to re-allocate income, deductions, or credits between or
among affiliates in order to prevent evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect
income." The Treasury regulations accompanying section 482 em-
phasize that an "arm's length" price must be charged in transactions
between related companies, 9 but the tests for determining an "arm's
length" price are exceedingly vague for cases where no similar transac-
tions can be found between unrelated parties. 10
Proposed Treasury Regulation 1.861-8 prescribes rules for determin-
ing domestic source and foreign source taxable income, 11 and it spe-
cifically outlines how business deductions are to be allocated between
domestic and foreign income. Because the proposed allocation-of-
deductions rules threaten U.S. taxpayers with a reduction in usable
foreign tax credits, they encourage higher royalty fees than are pres-
ently charged to foreign subsidiaries for licenses granted by U.S.
multinationals. 12 If the basic assumptions and principles underlying
proposed regulation 1.861-8 are sound, the rules announced therein
There may be different dimensions to licensing. For example, licenses may be exclusive
to the licensee, or non-exclusive, in which case the same license could be sold to more
than one licensee. Licenses may be limited as to what use a recipient can make of the
intangible (e.g., one licensee could receive the right to use a patented electronic compo-
nent to manufacture one product, while another licensee could receive the right to use
the same component in a different product). Finally, since intangibles are frequently the
subject of formal government protection (e.g., by a patent or copyright), granted by alimited jurisdiction (typically a nation), licenses are commonly restricted to the geo-
graphic area in which the rights can be exercised.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482.,
7. An "artificial" price is one that does not reasonably reflect the true value or market
value of the product or services exchanged. The term "transfer pricing" is used to refer
to pricing techniques among related companies. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
8. See text accompanying note 45 infra for section 482 in full.
9. Generally, an "arm's length" price is one that would be charged for the same
products or services between unrelated parties under similar circumstances. See, e.g.,
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-2(b)(3), (c)(2), and (d)(2) (1968) (as amended).
10. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
11. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8, 38 Fed. Reg. 15840 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Prop. Treas. Reg.].
12. A detailed discussion of this may be found in part III, infra.
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suggest a logical minimum safe-haven area 13 for royalty charges in
general. Accordingly, if the regulation is adopted, it may provide very
favorable pricing options for foreign-based companies who grant
licenses to U.S. subsidiaries, a consequence which may not have been
intended.
This Note will examine the implications of proposed regulation
1.861-8 for the administration of section 482, focusing on how a
foreign-based multinational corporation might use the principles of
1.861-8 to justify high royalty charges. Before discussing section 482
and 1.861-8, however, it is necessary to more fully develop the role of
royalty pricing in the tax planning strategy of global corporations, and
to explain why the United States needs to be concerned about transfer
prices charged by foreign multinationals.
THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF FOREIGN-BASED MULTI-
NATIONALS AND THE NATURE OF ROYALTY PRICING
AS A TRANSFER MECHANISM FOR THE
GLOBAL CORPORATION
A. PROBLEMS OF INCREASED FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
CONCERN OVER INTERCORPORATE PRICING
Foreign investors have been increasingly attracted to the world's
largest and richest market.1 4 By the end of 1973, there was $17.7
billion in direct foreign investment 5 in the United States (a 24 percent
increase over the 1972 level), 16 and foreign-controlled global corpora-
13. A "safe-haven" area describes a range of prices that will be accepted by IRS agents,
without a dispute, as arm's length prices. Royalties within the safe-haven area would not
be subject to a section 482 reallocation. If the assumptions and principles underlying the
proposed section 861 regulations are sound, the same assumptions and principles are
logically applicable to royalty pricing.
14. J. HEIN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE NON-AMERICAN
CHALLENGE 2-3 (The Conference Board, Worldbusiness Perspectives No. 16, August
1973). Other factors in the increase include the large U.S. capital market, the opportu-
nity to hire skilled U.S. managers and researchers, high real growth rates (compara-
tively), and the devaluations of the U.S. dollar.
15. "Direct investment" refers to equity ownership accompanied by managerial con-
trol, whereas "portfolio investment" is passive [i.e., the investor does not seek managerial
control].
16. In 1971, there was $13.7 billion in foreign direct investment in the United States;
in 1972, $14.3 billion. Leftwich, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States in 1973,
SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Aug. 1974, pt. II, at 7 (table I).
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tions owned over 700 major U.S. manufacturing enterprises. 17 There
are clear benefits to be derived from receiving more foreign invest-
ment, and it has been actively solicited and encouraged in some areas.18
But with this increase in foreign investment, the United States should
also anticipate some of the problems that are likely to arise in dealing
with subsidiaries of foreign global corporations.' 9 Among these is an
increasing difficulty in accurately assessing the impact of foreign-
owned subsidiaries on the U.S. balance-of-payments-a particularly
troublesome problem in light of the recent increase in the price of
foreign oil.
In general, multinational corporations create difficulties for
balance-of-payment accounting because of the ambiguities of inter-
corporate transfers. It is often 'difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether the prices for intercorporate impors and exports are set to
reflect their true value. As a restilt, it is difficult to determine if a local
corporation is being taxed on the full amount of income that is fairly
attributable to its operations, or on an amount created artificially
through transfer pricing.20 While the prior focus of the IRS has been
on pricing policies of U.S. parent corporations, the recent increase in
direct foreign investment means that the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
multinationals will also create transfer pricing problems. Consequently,
17. R. BARNET & R. MOLLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BARNET & MOLLER]
18. Among the major benefits are the reduction of the dollar surplus abroad, some
offset of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit (at least with the initial flow of investment),
and the possible introduction of new products and technology into the U.S. economy.
HEIN, supra note 14, at 4.
19. There is a general fear of foreign control over decisions that affect local economic
conditions. Moreover, there is concern that the interests of foreign corporate manage-
ment, which will not be influenced by citizenship ties to the U.S., may be at odds with the
best interests of the people of the United States. Note, The Rising of Reverse Flow, supra
note 3, at 553-56.
Legislation has been proposed in Congress that would limit the percentage of voting
securities of any S.E.C.-regulated issuer that could be acquired by noncitizens of the
United States. H.R. 11265, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill is aimed at preventing
undesirable social, political and economic consequences of foreign control of U.S.
companies, while hoping not to deter foreign portfolio investments.
20. "The tax authorities in the various countries, not having access to all the relevant
data in the books of the parent firm and the affiliates, cannot determine their consoli-
dated profits or evaluate the reasonableness of transfer prices." MULTINATIONAL CORPO-
RATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 67, U.N. Doc. STIECA/190 (1973). See also, BARNET &
MOLLER 266-67, in which the authors cite a recent Rand Corporation study as concluding
that ". . . because of the widespread use of transfer pricing and the importance of
intracorporate transactions in the U.S. economy, Department of Commerce balance-of-
payments statistics on foreign trade and foreign-earned income are 'totally unreliable.'"
Id. at 267.
(Vol. 8: 229
Proposed Treasury Regulation 1.861-8
the tax statutes and administrative regulations that deal with the
problem must be applied to the U.S. operations of both U.S.-based and
foreign-based global corporations; a task to which they may not be
equal if competing tax policies are involved.
B. TRANSFER PRICING AND GLOBAL CORPORATE PLANNING
One of the main goals of global corporate planning is to provide for
the free movement of funds among affiliated companies, 21 so that the
total corporate global tax bill can be minimized.2 2 Subordinating the
interests of any particular affiliate to those of the corporate family as a
whole, multinationals seek to shift funds so that affiliates in tax-haven
areas can be used effectively23 and the limitations on the U.S. foreign
tax credit can be avoided.2 4 Moreover, profit figures can be adjusted
downward to achieve other subsidiary objectives such as promotion of a
favorable corporate public image where a showing of high profits
would be politically undesirable.
25
21. Having "free movement of funds" means that the global corporation can adjust
the accounts of related corporations, shifting and allocating profits and losses among
them at will. It does not mean that there will be no costs or tax consequences at all on
transfers of funds.
The term "affiliate" refers to any member of the corporate family (parent or sub-
sidiary). The important reality is that all affiliates are owned and managed by the same
economic interests.
22. A recent U.S. study concludes that "[iun a global context, the free movement of
funds is the bloodstream of the corporation." MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20, at 41.
23. A "tax-haven" area is one that offers comparatively favorable tax treatment-
either because of a generally low rate on all income, because of a low rate on foreign
income, or because it offers tax holidays to its taxpayers. For example, Grand Cayman
Island, a small Caribbean island, is equipped with ninety-five different banks and boasts of
"... complete freedom from all forms of taxation." Quoted in BARNET & MOLLER 281. A
global corporation can set up an "export corporation" on Grand Cayman with nothing
more than a desk, a telex cable, and a bank account. Through free movement of funds,
the corporation might attempt to show profits on the books of the "export corporation"
rather than on the books of its other affiliates, so that the profits would escape taxation
when they are "earned." For a general discussion and examples of the effective use of tax
havens, see id. at 281-83. Guides for the taxpayer on how to use tax havens include: N.
Fox, INTERNATIONAL TAX HAVEN AND INVESTORS DIRECTORY (1975); M. GRUNDY, TAX
HAVENS (3d ed. 1974); TAX HAVEN REVIEW (N. Fox ed.), a periodical published since
1974 in Copenhagen.
24. The limitation on the U.S. foreign tax credit is directly related to the U.S.
taxpayer's foreign source income, so the more income a multinational can shift from
domestic to foreign, sources, the higher the limitation. Since most payments from
affiliates to a U.S. corporation can be structured to create foreign source income for that
corporation, free movement of funds allows an upward adjustment of the limitation as
needed. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
25. BARNET & MULLER 159. One of the main criticisms voiced by Latin Americans has
been that multinationals repatriate unduly high profits from their Latin American
1975]
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The payment of dividends from a subsidiary to its shareholder/
parent corporation is only one method, and perhaps not the principal
one, of shifting funds. Other methods include transfer payments for
royalties, goods purchased from affiliates, interest on loans, rents, and
technical-services fees. Because the global management controls both
parties to such transfer transactions, the price-determining influence of
a market-place is avoided, and prices can be set as high or low as
various governmental regulatory agencies will allow. 26 Indeed, a
former Treasury official is reported to have said that "[p]rices in an
economic sense.., do not exist" in intercorporate transfers. 27 They are
often determined for the primary purpose of shifting funds, not to
reflect the fair value of the goods, services, or licenses transferred.
Moreover, sophisticated accounting techniques aid multinationals in
escaping regulation by confusing or misleading local tax or other
authorities. 28 These techniques include undervaluing exports from
high tax-rate countries, directing underpriced exports to tax-haven
affiliates for resale at fair market value on the open market, and
operations. See Wionczek, A Latin American View, in How LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE U.S.
INVESTOR 3 (R. Vernon ed. 1966).
26. Note that this may be true even where a subsidiary is not wholly owned. Manage-
rial control over the business decisions of the affiliates is the key. Even where a global
corporation's ownership is phased out, for example, by a Latin American legislative
requirement, managerial control may be maintained. An example of the fadeout re-
quirement is the Andean Foreign Investment Code, declaration 7 and art. 28. Decision
24, Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, adopted Dec. 31, 1970, amended by
Decision 37 of June 24, 1971 and Decision 37-A of July 17, 1971, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
126 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Andean Foreign Investment Code].
27. BARNET & MFJLLER 277.
28. Barnet and Muiller state:
The institutional lag that cripples governments in their efforts to prevent global
corporations from circumventing the spirit of tax, securities, and banking laws is
due in no small measure to the technological breakthroughs of the accounting
industry....
Skilled obfuscation is now an essential accounting tool. The challenge is to
create a tidy world for investors, regulatory agencies, and tax collectors to
scrutinize, which may have little or no resemblance to what an old-fashioned
bookkeeper might have called the real world. Indeed, it is often desirable to
create a different world for each.
Id. at 263.
Documentation of specific examples of artificial transfer pricing is difficult, since
corporate books are not publicly available, but impressive studies have been made
nonetheless. See, e.g., C. VATSOS, COMERCIALIZACi6N DE TECHNOLOGfA EN EL PACTO
ANDINO 117-24 (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1973); Lall, Pricing by Multinational
Manufacturing Firms, OXFORD BULL. OF ECON. AND STATISTICS, Aug. 1973, at 173; Vaitsos,
Transfer of Resources and Preservation of Monopoly Rents, DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY SERVICE:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT 168 (1970). See BARNET & MuLLFR 158-61, and the
other studies on transfer pricing which they cite at 411.
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overpricing imports into high tax areas.29 Flexibility in shifting funds
can also be achieved by varying the transfer prices of goods, services, or
royalty rates. As one corporate exdcutive has reportedly remarked:
"The best way to bring money back varies with the situation .... We
call the payments whatever seems best under the circumstances."30
One of the most common and most flexible methods of shifting
funds is through the pricing of royalties and related sevices. 31 Many
times companies view royalty and technical-services fees as completely
interchangeable, 32 while at other times companies repatriate funds only
through inflated prices for goods transferred, and do not make royalty
or technical-services charges at all.3" Sometimes higher royalty charges
are desirable, while at other times higher technical-services fees are
preferable, depending on the local tax treatment of each.
Royalty payments to affiliates for licenses generally meet with ap-
proval from the local government of the transferee, since licenses often
bring desirable new technology into the country.34 Since royalty pricing
29. BARNET & M0ULLER 157-59. Crawford, Transfer Pricing in International Transactions,
1974 MULTINAT'L Bus. No. 3, at 1.
30. Quoted in M. DUERR, TAx ALLOCATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 32 (1972) (A
Research Report from The Conference Board).
31. "Related services" refers to services rendered in connection with the intangible,
such as consultant or management assistance that contributes to effective use of the
license. The term "royalties" will generally be used to include any "related services."
"Technical services fees," as used herein, will refer to services not related to licenses and
royalties.
32. M. DUERR, supra note 30, at 40.
33. Id. at 32-33. Section 482 governs the U.S. treatment not only of the use of
royalties, but of technical services fees or inflated prices for goods, although the
regulations for each are different. See notes 48 and 49 infra and accompanying text.
34. Many nations, however, particularly in Latin America, are now questioning the
value of receiving new technology as an end in itself. Besides the problem of overpricing,
some nations have found that transferred technology contributes to capital-intensive
industries and does nothing to create new jobs for their nationals. Strings attached to
license contracts, especially those that bind the transferee to purchasing future services
and goods from the transferor, are seen as hindering the development of indigenous
technology. Other transfer agreements may prohibit the export of goods produced with
the transferred rights, and these are seen as dooming less developed nations to endless
balance-of-payments deficits. See Gordon, The Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth
with Foreign Investment: Controlled but Participatory Democracy, 10 CALIF. W. L. REv. 1
(1973); CACTAL Sets Strategyfor Science and Technology, 24 AMERICAS No. 8, at 44 (1972);
Program for the Application of Science and Technology to Latin American Development, 24
AMERICAS No. 10 (Supp. 1972).
Many nations have responded with statutes limiting the terms of technology transfers.
See, e.g., Andean Foreign Investment Code, arts. 18-26, supra note 26. See Lacey,
Technology and Industrial Property Licensing in Latin America: A Legislative Revolution, 6 INT'L
LAWYER 388 (1972).
In cases where the foreign investor is from a less-industrialized nation (e.g., a
petrodollar investor) there may be no technology to transfer legitimately, and the use of
royalty pricing may be unrealistic. See note 40 infra.
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is used by multinationals to shift funds, however, the royalty fees may
bear no relation at all to the value of the technology transferred, 35 and
it is very difficult for local authorities to estimate the true value of the
licenses involved. 36 Whereas prices set on the transfer of certain goods
can be evaluated by comparing prices charged to affiliates with prices
on the open market,37 a package of intangiblei (such as licenses and
related services) is harder to scrutinize, since the needs of any particu-
lar transferee (i.e., affiliate) may be unique. In such an inter-corporate
context, there is no real open market price with which the trans-
fer price can be compared. Therefore, the royalty transfer price
mechanism is an especially attractive means for global corporations to
clothe the transfer of funds in a legitimate guise, though in fact shifting
them principally to avoid taxation.
C. THE U.S. PROBLEM WITH ROYALTY PRICING
In dealing with artificial royalty pricing, the U.S. tax authorities have
focused primarily on cases in which a U.S.-based multinational has
granted a license to a foreign affiliate at a very low price. In such cases,
the obvious intent of the domestic parent is to undervalue the intangi-
ble for export, thereby reducing taxable income in the U.S. in favor of
increasing the income of the affiliated recipient abroad. In fact, in a
Treasury department study of international cases in which IRS agents
had recommended section 482 allocations, 38 it was found that in 73
percent of the cases involving intangibles, no consideration at all had
been charged by the U.S. taxpayer/licensor to the related foreign
licensee. 39
The current growth of foreign direct investment in the United States
is likely to create another kind of problem with royalty pricing: a
35. The fact that royalty charges often bear no relation at all to the value of actually
transferred technology is clear to authors who have examined them. MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20, at 49-52; M. DUERR, supra note
30, at 32-33. "Managers of global-corporation subsidiaries operating in Latin America
whom we have interviewed admit that overvaluing of technology is 'standard practice.'"
BARNET & M0LLER 165.
36. See note 28 supra.
37. This was the method used by Vaitsos and Lall in their studies, supra note 28.
38. Discussion of the mechanics of section 482 begins at note 45 infra and accompany-
ing text.
39. Summary Study of International Cases Involving Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code,
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY NEWS, Jan. 8, 1973, at 25 (GPO 940-909) [hereinafter
cited as Summary Study].
[Vol. 8: 229
Proposed Treasury Regulation 1.861-8
foreign-controlled U.S. taxpayer overvaluing the import of an intangible.
By charging a U.S. subsidiary an artificially high royalty price, a foreign
multinational parent could reduce the U.S. affiliate's taxable income in
favor of increasing the income of a related company in a country with
lower tax-rates. 40 The potential implications of this possibility are
significant: the level of payments for royalties and fees41 from U.S.
companies to related foreign firms was $208 million in 1973, a 34
percent increase over the 1972 level, and a 76 percent increase since
1971.42 Moreover, royalties and fees represent a fairly substantial
factor in the total outflow of funds related to direct investment.43 In
1972, for example, 18.4 percent of the total outflow of $841 million
was in the form of payments for royalties and fees.44 In light of these
considerations it is clear that the United States must now cope with the
dual aspects of the royalty transfer pricing problem.
40. Almost all of the current foreign direct investment in the United States is from
countries whose corporations legitimately might have technology to sell to U.S. sub-
sidiaries, and whose accountants certainly understand highly sophisticated accounting
techniques. By 1973, 95.4 percent of foreign investment in the United States was owned
by interests in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Economic Community
nations. HEIN, supra note 14, at 2.
The inflow of petrodollars has probably changed this distribution, however, and there
is some question as to how much "technology" is held by interests in some of the
less-industrialized countries that could be legitimately licensed to U.S. affiliates. If
petrodollars are invested indirectly (portfolio investments), or are invested in real estate,
they will not affect global transfer pricing schemes. On the other hand, petrodollar
investment in non-U.S. global corporations might very well encourage more U.S. sub-
sidiary corporations and more transfer pricing activity. Further, petrodollars might be
invested directly in intangible property rights which could be leased to others.
41. The U.S. Department of Commerce statistics do not distinguish royalties and
related fees from technical service fees in-the line item "fees and royalties." See, e.g.,
SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Sept. 1974, at 42, table 2, lines 7, 8, 21 and 22. See also note 31,
supra. Given the fact that many companies use the categories interchangeably, however
(see note 32 supra and accompanying text), this failure is not significant.
42. SURVEY OF CulRENT Bus., Aug. 1974, pt. II, at 9, table 5. Repatriation using
royalties has recently increased at a faster rate than the increase in foreign direct
investment: the $17,748 million in the United States at the end of 1973 represented a
24 percent increase over the 1972 level and a 30 percent increase since 1971. Id. at 7,
table 1.
43. Note, however, that the flow of royalties and fees into the United States from
foreign affiliates is still much higher ($2.8 billion in 1973) than this outflow. Freidlin &
Lupo, U.S. Direct Investments Abroad in 1973, id. at 11, table 2, line 20. Nevertheless, at a
time when all elements of the net U.S. balance-of-payments are important, an outflow of
$208 million should be examined carefully.
44. Leftwich, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States in 1973, id. at 8, table 3. Of the
$841 million that left the United States as return on investment in 1972, 34.7 percent left
in the form of branch earnings (from unincorporated affiliates), 44.4 percent in div-
idends, 2.5 percent in interest payments, and 18.4 percent in royalties and fees. In the
same year, $496 million of the U.S. earnings were reinvested in the United States.
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II
SECTION 482 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A. THE "ARM's LENGTH" TEST
The administrative authority to deal with the problem of artificial
royalty payments is contained in section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code:
§ 482. ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS AMONG TAXPAYERS
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether
or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or alloca-
tion is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses.
This broad grant of administrative power is clearly sufficient to justify
IRS action in any case of artificial pricing.45 Problems have arisen,
however, when the IRS has attempted to define standards for deter-
mining transfer prices that clearly reflect taxable income.
The current Treasury Regulations accompanying section 482 require
that transactions between entities that are controlled by the same
interests be made "at an arm's length"4 6 -i.e., as if between indepen-
dent, unrelated parties of equal bargaining power. Section 1.482-2 of
the regulations describes tests for an arm's length transaction in a
variety of contexts, 47 among them transactions involving royalty trans-
fers. Although royalties for the transfer or use of intangibles 48 are
generally treated separately from charges for the performance of
services, 49 services rendered in connection with the transfer of intangi-
bles are treated together with the royalty for the intangibles, and no
separate allocation by the IRS can be made."0
45. A heavy burden is on the taxpayer to show abuse of administrative discretion-
-that the IRS was "arbitrary and capricious"-in order to nullify an IRS reallocation.
Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114, 126 (1964), aff'd 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 899 (1966). The burden is even greater in a refund case, where the taxpayer
must additionally prove what the correct allocation should have been. Helvering v.
Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935); United States v. Pfister, 205 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1953).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (1968).
47. The regulations describe different tests for an arm's length dealing where services
are performed, where tangible property is used, where intangible property is used or
transferred, and where tangible property is sold. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (1968) (as
amended).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d) (1968) (as amended).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (1968) (as amended).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(8) (1968) (as amended).
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The greatest problem with the present tests arises when no similar
transactions can be found between unrelated parties; precisely the
situation likely to arise in corporate transfers, which by their very
nature, are likely to be transactions that frequently no unrelated parties
would ever enter into. If no sufficiently similar situations can be found,
the regulations list twelve factors upon which the IRS can rely to
determine an artificial arm's length price.51 But the list raises more
questions than it answers, because there is no requirement that any or
all of the factors actually be considered, and there is no indication of
the relative weight to be ascribed to the various factors.52 No concrete
tests emerge, resulting in vague standards which are difficult to apply.
B. APPLICATION OF THE ARM's LENGTH STANDARD
As mentioned above, section 482 has been used in the area of royalty
pricing predominantly to correct prices, charged by a U.S. company to a
foreign affiliate, that the IRS has found to be set at less than an arm's
length level.53 The reverse situation, in which a foreign transferor has
charged a related U.S. taxpayer royalty rates that the IRS might find to
be higher than an arm's length price, has apparently received little
attention, official or otherwise. A study by the Conference Board refers
to but one such situation. In that case, the IRS disallowed an entire
royalty payment to a foreign parent, claiming that there was no
justification for the payment, and taxed it as a dividend.54
In general, U.S. taxpayers have found it hard to comply with the
arm's length standard because they cannot predict with any certainty
how the IRS will treat their transfers.5 5 In cases in which companies
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii) (1968) (as amended).
52. For a discussion of some of the problems with 1.482-2(d), see Note, Application of
Section 482 to the Transfer or Use of Intangible Property, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 202 (1969). See
also Bischel, Tax Allocations Concerning Inter-Company Pricing Transactions in Foreign Opera-
tions: A Reappraisal, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 490 (1973).
53. Summary Study supra note 39, at 25. Of all international cases covered by the IRS
study of the use of section 482, 10 percent of the adjustments made were in the area of
allocations on royalties paid for intangibles. Id. at 16. The amount of the adjustments
made regarding intangibles (in a two-year period during the late sixties) was $52.4
million, about 8 percent of the total. Id. at 19. The average amount per adjustment made
regarding the transfer of intangibles was $524,000. Id. at 20. The study uses "per
adjustment" to include all adjustments of a given category made for a single U.S.
taxpayer in a single year.
54. M. DUERR, supra note 30, at 33-34. The foreign parent objected, claiming it had
paid a premium over book value for the license when it bought the U.S. subsidiary, and
an appeal through tax treaty channels was under way when the study was published.
55. One of the main reasons that The Conference Board, a business research organi-
zation, undertook the DUERR study, id., was to document and articulate the problems that
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have had no intent to effect a shift of funds among affiliates, they have
gone out of their way to set prices based on what they hoped would
satisfy the IRS auditor or foreign tax authorities.5 6 Business experience
seems to indicate that section 482 allocations on royalty charges are
often considered on a case by case basis, without the application of
consistent underlying principles, and that many bargained settlements
with the IRS auditors have resulted in pricing that bears no relation to
the true value of the license whatsoever.5 7
Everyone would benefit from a clearer definition of the test for an
arm's length transaction. Not only would the administrative task of the
IRS be facilitated, but corporations could plan with greater certainty.58
Moreover, it is entirely possible that useful foreign investment is now
deterred from entering this 'country because of the uncertainty and
ambiguity of IRS treatment of intercorporate transfers. 59 But the task
of establishing better standards has been made more difficult by the
emerging need to deal with both U.S. licensors and licensees. In the
absence of a clear test applicable to all cases, the definition of minimal
safe-haven areas would be helpful.60 The recently proposed Treasury
regulation 1.861-8 offers a possible safe-haven area for minimal rates
that a foreign multinational could legitimately charge a U.S. affiliate. 1
III
PROPOSED TREASURY REGULATION 1.861-8
A. THE LOGIC OF REGULATION 1.861-8
Sections 861-863 of the Internal Revenue Code define income from
sources within and without the United *States for various tax pur-
poses. 62 Appropriate expenses and deductions attributable to each
U.S. multinationals were having with § 482. The study was financed by forty-six
corporations, all associates of The Conference Board.
56. Id. at 32.
57. Id. at 32-39.
58. Corporate planning is especially difficult because audits may require allocations
years after the transactions took place.
59. The IRS disallowance of an entire royalty payment shortly after a foreign parent
had paid a premium for the license rights, supra note 54 and accompanying text, would
certainly be cause for concern among potential foreign investors.
60. "Safe-haven" area is defined in note 13 supra.
61. See Bischel, supra note 52, at 511. M. DUERR, SUpra note 30, at 79-93, makes some
other suggestions for the improvement of the section 482 allocation system.
62. The source-of-income rules are applicable to the limitations on the foreign tax
credit (§§ 904(a)(1) and (2)), the DISC intercompany pricing rules (§ 994), "effectively
connected" taxable income (§§ 871 and 882), foreign base company income (§ 954(b)(5)),
and income partly from within and partly from without the U.S. (§ 863(b)).-
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category of income are considered in arriving at taxable domestic
source income and taxable foreign source income. The source-of-
income distinction is important because the limitation on the foreign
tax credit is based on the proportion of taxable foreign source income
to total taxable income.
63
Proposed regulation section 1.861-8 describes methods for allocating
and apportioning expenses, losses, and other deductions between
domestic source and foreign source income.6 4 Section 1.861-8 (e)(3)
deals specifically with research and experimental expenditures. 65 It
63. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 905. For a taxpayer electing the overall limitation:
taxable foreign
foreign tax credit - tentative U.S. tax x source income
limitation (before credit) taxable income from
all sources
If the "per country" method is used, taxable income from a particular country or U.S.
possession is substituted for taxable foreign source income to arrive at the limitation for
that country. For a good explanation of how the credit works, and the extent of its use,
see SUPPLEMENTAL STATISTICS OF INCOME 1964, 1965, AND 1966: FOREIGN INCOME AND
TAxES 4-19 (Internal Revenue Service Publication No. 479 (4-73), 1973).
64. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8. Deductions are first allocated to a specific class of
income, when they are "definitely related" to that class, i.e., when they are incurred as a
result of or incident to an activity (or in connection with property) which can reasonably
be expected to generate income (e.g., of a class of income: income generated from the
sale of a certain product and income generated from the sale of an intangible property
license). Some deductions may be related to more than one specific class, and they must
be allocated to a larger class which encompasses the other classes (e.g., general adminis-
trative costs might be allocated to "all gross income" as a class). Some deductions are not
definitely related to any gross income at all, such as charitable contributions, or the costs
of compiling an annual shareholder's report. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-8(c)(2) and
(e)(9).
As a second step, income within a specific class is apportioned among statutory group-
ings and/or residual gross income. A class of income may be included in more than one
statutory grouping. An example of a statutory grouping is foreign source income where
the overall foreign tax credit limitation is elected. Where the per-country limitation is
used, foreign source income from each foreign country or U.S. possession comprises a
separate statutory grouping. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-8(a) and (b). Residual gross
income is income which does not need to be separated out of all gross income for the
purposes of determining taxable income from some specific source or activity under an
operative provision of the I.R.C. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(a)(3). Deductions that
are not definitely related to gross income are also apportioned among statutory group-
ings. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-8(c)(2) and (e)(9).
In terms of the considerations of this Note, the amounts of deductions that end up in
various statutory groups or residual gross income are crucial, because they determine the
extent to which a taxpayer will get credit for income taxes paid to foreign governments
on its U.S. tax bill (i.e., they determine the limitations on the foreign tax credit).
65. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3):
Research and experimental expenditures--(i) Allocation.-Expenditures for research
and development which a taxpayer deducts under section 174 shall be con-
sidered deductions which are definitely related to the class of gross income to
which such research and development activity gives rise or is reasonably ex-
pected to give rise and shall be allocated to such class. Where research and
development is intended to create, or is reasonabli expected to result in the
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addresses the situation in which a U.S. taxpayer realizes income of
disparate types, as, for example, when he carries on research to
improve a product or increase sales of the product and earns both
domestic income from the sales of the product, and foreign source
income from royalties charged to a foreign company (whether or not
affiliated) for licenses giving it the right to sell the product abroad. The
research undertaken is of potential benefit to both the taxpayer and the
licensee, but the expense is currently incurred only by the U.S.
taxpayer/licensor. Section 861 requires that the U.S. taxpayer appor-
tion his research deduction between domestic income (from domestic
sales of the product related to the research) and foreign source income
(from the royalty charge to the licensee). Subsection 1.861-8(e)(3)(ii)
stipulates that:
creation of, specific intangible properties or processes, or is intended or is
reasonably expected to result in the improvement of specific properties or
processes, deductions in connection with such research and development shall
be considered definitely related and therefore allocable to the class of gross
income to which the properties or processes give rise or are reasonably expected
to give rise. Experience in the past with research and development shall be
considered in determining reasonable expectations. In other cases, as in the case
of most basic research, research and development shall generally be considered
definitely related and therefore allocable to all gross income of the current
taxable year which is likely to benefit from the research and development. The
gross income of the current taxable year which can be reasonably assumed to
have benefitted from similar research and development in the past is ordinarily
acceptable as an indication of likely benefits from current research and de-
velopment. The types of gross income to which deductions for research and
development expenses are generally allocable include, but are not limited to,
gross income from:
(A) The sale or rental of tangible property or the performance of services
with respect to which intangible property is used,
(B) The lump-sum sale of intangible property,
(C) The licensing or other use of intangible property, and
(D) The receipt of dividends from a corporation the stock of which was
acquired for intangible property in a tax-free exchange or from a corporation to
which intangible property was transferred as a contribution to capital.
(ii) Apportionment. If the gross income resulting from research and develop-
ment activity is or is reasonably expected to be of disparate types, such as sales
income and royalty income, apportionment of the deductions for research and
development expenses allocated thereto on such basis as gross income or gross
receipts will not generally be reasonable.
(iii) Examples. Reasonable methods of allocation and apportionment are il-
lustrated by examples (1) and (10) through (13) of paragraph (g) of this section.
It should be noted that the methods of allocation and apportionment illustrated
by these examples may not be appropriate in any case where important distin-
guishing factors are present. For instance, some of the examples use units as a
basis for apportionment of research and development expenses. Nonetheless, if
a research activity benefits two or more products with dissimilar characteristics
(such as jet airplane tires and bicycle tires), apportionment on the basis of units
may create distortions and, therefore, would be inappropriate.
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If the gross income resulting from research and development activity is or is
reasonably expected to be of disparate types, such as sales income and royalty
income, apportionment of the deductions for research and development ex-
penses allocated thereto on such basis as gross income or gross receipts will not
generally be reasonable.
66
Since the research expenses cannot be apportioned according to the
U.S. taxpayer's gross income from domestic sales and from royalty fees,
an alternative basis for apportionment is needed. Example 12 of
regulation 1.86 1-8(g) suggests that unit sales would be appropriate for
this purpose, in the absence of an indication that current unit sales are
not a reasonable basis for estimating future unit sales. In other words,
the cost of research that may improve a product or benefit future sales
should be allocated between domestic income and foreign source
income, based on current unit sales of the product in the United States
and abroad, even though units sold abroad are sold by the transferee,
not by the U.S. taxpayer. The actual income to the transferor from its
foreign source is irrelevant to the apportionment of the research
deduction.
This method of apportionment is a substantial inducement for the
U.S. taxpayer to recover from the licensee that portion of the expenses
that are fairly attributable to the licensee's unit sales, plus an amount at
least sufficient to pay foreign withholding taxes on the royalty fee to
the licensor.6 7 In the situation considered here, the only way to ac-
66. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).
67. For example, suppose a domestic corporation, P, sells 75,000 units of X at
$10/unit, and spends $60,000 on research and development to improve X. P licenses the
rights to manufacture and sell X abroad to S, a wholly owned subsidiary, which sells
25,000 units at $10 and pays a royalty to P of 4 percent of its gross sales ($10,000).
Suppose S's nation taxes P on the royalty payment at a rate of 30 percent ($3,000), and
S's income from X is taxed at 48 percent in the United States. Assume P has deductions
of $650,000 on X (for "R & D," cost of goods sold, overhead and management expense,
etc.). Then:
10,000 foreign source income (FSI) from royalty
+ 750,000 domestic source income (DSI) from sales of X
760,000 U.S. gross income (GI) on X
- 650,000 deductions (ded.) (including "R & D")
110,000 U.S. taxable income (USTI)
52,800 tentative U.S. tax at 48% (ten. US tax)
A) Basing its'apportionment of "R & D" expense on gross income to P, the amount
apportioned to P's foreign source income would be:
10,000 (FSI) X 60,000 (ded.) = 789
760,000 (GI)
Therefore:
10,000 FSI
- 789 FS ded.
9,211 FSTI
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complish this is to adjust the royalty charges so that the U.S. taxpayer's
actual foreign source income is at least as great as these amounts. If the
And the limitation on P's foreign tax credit, (FTC lim), (see note 63 supra) would be:
FTC lim = 52,800 (ten. US tax) x 9,211 (FSTI) = 442111,0 (USTI)
All of the $3,000 paid to S's nation (30% of $10,000) would be credited to P's U.S. tax
bill, since that sum is less than FTC lim.
B) Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8 would prohibit an apportionment based on gross
income, however, and 1.86 1-8(g) (example 12) suggests using unit sales as a basis for
apportionment. The amount of P's "R & D" deduction apportioned to foreign source
income would then be:
250,000 (S's units sold)
1,000,000 (total units sold) x 60,000 (ded.) = 15,000
So:
10,000 FSI
- 15,000 FS ded.
zero FSTI
And:
FTC lim = 52,800 x 110 = zero
In other words, none of the $3,000 paid to S's nation would be credited, and after paying
the 48 percent tax on the royalty to the United States ($4800), P would have paid a total
of $7,800 on the $10,000 royalty (an effective tax rate of 78 percent).
C) The only way for P to avoid this double taxation and high effective rate is to
increase the royalty charge until it covers the "R & D" deduction apportioned to P's
foreign source income and the foreign tax as well. The result is a royalty charge of
$40,000 instead of $10,000 (and a payment of a 30 percent tax or $12,000 to S's nation).
Now:
40,000 FSI
+ 750,000 DSI
790,000 GI apportioned FS ded. = 15,000 (as above)
- 650,000 ded.
140,000 USTI
67,520 ten. US tax
So:
40,000 FSI
- 15,000 FSded.
25,000 FSTI
And:
FTC lim = 67,200 x 25,000 = 12,000140,000
All $12,000 paid to S's nation would be credited to the U.S. tax bill, and P's total tax
would be $19,200 on a royalty of $40,000:
40,000 x .48 (US rate)= 19,200 ten. US tax
- 12,000 FTC
7,200 US tax
+ 12,000 tax to S's nation
19,200 total tax (a 48% rate)
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royalty charges are less than what is necessary to produce such a result,
the U.S. taxpayer will have a foreign source deduction that exceeds its
foreign source income, so that its taxable foreign source income will be
zero. 8 As a consequence, the limitation on its foreign tax credit would
be zero, and any taxes paid abroad on the royalty income could not be
credited to its U.S. tax bill. Thus it appears that the net effect of the
proposed regulation on royalty charges would be to force a U.S.
licensor either to forego a foreign tax credit (unless it can spread the
deduction to other nations under the overall limitation) or charge
royalty fees that represent at least that portion of ongoing research
costs which the foreign unit sales of the licensee currently bear to total
worldwide unit sales of the related product (plus enough to pay any
foreign or state taxes on the royalty income).69
In cases where the IRS felt that U.S. companies were transferring
licenses or other intangibles at artificially low prices, the provisions of
the new regulation would frequently force the prices up, and without
the use of section 482 and its necessary audits and remedial action, the
U.S. transferor's domestic taxable income would be increased. The
logic of section 1.861-8 provides a straightforward and easily applied
formula for all licensors as to how high royalty rates would have to be
to offset the licensee's share of research and development expenses.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 1.861-8
The policy motivation underlying proposed regulation 1.861-8 is a
desire to limit the use of deduction allocations as a mechanism for
effectively shifting funds from U.S. parent companies to foreign sub-
In the context of the global corporation, this royalty increase means that S's income is
decreased in favor of P's income. If the tax rate on S's income (imposed by its own
nation) is less than the U.S. tax rate of 48 percent on P's income, then global manage-
ment would have to weigh the tax "savings" due to the reduction in the effective U.S. tax
rate on the royalty payment against any tax savings foregone due to the reduction of S's
income in favor of P. The tax rate on S's income would determine the optimal royalty
transfer price.
68. Under the proposed system, it is possible for a taxpayer to have foreign source
deductions greater than its foreign source income. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(d).
69. However, some U.S. licensors may have enough other foreign source income, and
even enough per-country foreign source income, that they can keep the foreign tax
credit limitation sufficiently high. In these cases, the effect would be perhaps only to
cause a reexamination of tax strategy on whether to elect a per-country or an overall
limitation. The amount of other transactions and the relative rates charged by the
foreign tax collectors would help determine how much the regulation would affect a
given taxpayer.
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sidiaries. 70 The IRS feels that United States-based multinationals are
allocating an unreasonably large portion of their research and de-
velopment costs to domestic sales income, when in fact the product
technology created is greatly enhancing sales income abroad as well.
This practice is, in effect, a royalty transfer pricing mechanism, since
multinationals are transferring the benefits of the product technology
without charging sufficiently high royalty fees to receive a reasonable
portion of the costs of creating the product technology in return.71 The
regulation attempts to outline a reasonable basis for allocating research
and development expenses so that the "R & D" deduction is fairly
matched with all of the income generated by the expenditure.72
It must be remembered, however, that the principles and regulations
that deal with intercorporate royalty pricing must be applied to both
U.S. and foreign-based global corporations. If proposed regulation
1.861-8 tends to force royalty prices for U.S. transferors upward,
consistency demands that it should do the same for U.S. transferees. If
certain ongoing research expenditures are properly attributable to
foreign licensees based on the percentage of worldwide sales rep-
resented by licensee sales, then foreign licensors should fairly be able
to base their royalty fees on the same grounds. 73 Thus, as a first step
toward a safe-haven minimum price, the foreign licensor could im-
mediately figure in that portion of its research and development
expenses that are fairly attributable to the licensee's unit sales as a
proportion of worldwide unit sales. Provisions of the regulation point
70. See Cole, Highlights of the Proposed Regulations on Allocation and Apportionment of
Deductions, 39 J. TAXATIoN 272-74 (1973); Tannenbaum, Limiting the Foreign Tax Credit:
Treasury Trying to Stiffen Vital Deduction Allocation Rules, 2 TAx NoTMs No. 2, Jan. 14, 1974,
at 12.
71. The practice has a double benefit to global corporations. It not only gives a foreign
subsidiary product technology at bargain prices, but it also keeps the U.S. parent's
foreign tax credit limitation high by not deducting the proportionate cost of creating the
technology from foreign source income. See note 63 supra.
72. The problem is one of the present deduction allocation of future benefits. Section
174 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a current deduction for "R & D" but
conceptually, the amortization of "R & D" costs over several years makes more sense.
"Given this inherent mismatching of R & D expense and income, . . . the proposed
regulations are a reasonable, though admittedly imperfect, solution to an issue incapable
of a perfect solution." Ira Tannenbaum, quoted in TAIA Analysis Supports IRS Authority for
Deduction Allocation Rules, 2 TAx NoTEs No. 48, Dec. 2, 1974, at 10.
73. In the case of U.S. branch operations of foreign companies, the analysis is the
same. A portion of the overall research and development costs can be attributed and
apportioned to the gross income of the U.S. branch based on the branch's unit sales. In
this situation there are no royalty fees paid and no licenses granted, but by apportioning
deductions, the taxable income of the U.S. branch is reduced in a way similar to the
subsidiary situation.
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out that research costs are commonly the principal factor in generating
royalty income; it is clear, therefore, that they are "definitely related" to
royalty income.
7 4
This first step may be an especially advantageous one for a foreign
licensor seeking to justify high royalty charges to a U.S. affiliate. Two
of the major reasons for setting up operations in the United States are
to obtain access to the large and wealthy U.S. market, and to export
from the United States to areas that could not be served as economi-
cally from the corporation's home country.75 Both of these indicate that
U.S. unit sales are likely to be relatively high, which in turn justifies the
reflection of a high percentage of research and development costs in
royalty prices.
This "R & D" element in setting a foreign licensor's royalty fee is,
however, only a first step. Section 1.861-8 informs U.S. taxpayers
generally that actual income from foreign sources must exceed deduc-
tions attributable to them in order to qualify for a foreign tax credit.
The underlying rationale of this rule applies logically to any licensor
(foreign or domestic). The method suggested by the regulation re-
quires a licensor to examine its own expenses (deductions) and, using
the outlined allocation and apportionment rules, charge the licensee a
royalty fee that exceeds the apportioned share of those expenses
attributed to the royalty income. This meth6dology can be extended to
other expenses besides those for research and development.
The obvious next step is a "tax element." The licensor must pay taxes
on the royalty payment, including often an income tax levied by the
transferee's jurisdiction (on income earned therein by the licensor), and
possibly including a national and/or local tax imposed by the trans-
feror's taxing jurisdictions.7 6 Expenditures for income taxes are obvi-
ously allocable to the income on which the taxes are imposed. In terms
of a deduction apportionable to foreign source income, the "tax ele-
ment" would be that part of a U.S. taxpayer's section 164 deduction
which is due to (i.e., definitely related to) royalty income from a foreign
74. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(c)(vi): "[R]esearch activity will normally be the princi-
pal factor in the generation of the royalty income..
75. HEIN, supra note 14, at 2.
76. Tax treaties are likely to reduce taxes imposed by the transferee nation and/or the
transferor's nation. For example, the 30 percent U.S. withholding tax on royalty pay-
ments to foreigners might be reduced to as little as 5 percent by an applicable tax treaty.
While the U.S. foreign tax credit works to prevent double international taxation, state or
local income taxes on payments into the United States may still apply.
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source." This element of the royalty charge is greater than the tax rate
times the rest of the royalty fee, since the tax rate applies to the total
payment made by the licensee, including the initial charge plus the tax.
Further, payment must be sufficiently greater than the allocable deduc-
tions to ensufe that foreign taxable income allows a limitation on the
foreign tax credit that is high enough to cover the taxes paid to the
licensee's government.7 8 The licensor must set the "tax element" high
enough so that the after-tax receipt will cover the "R & D" element and
whatever other elements the licensor can justify.
A third element to add to a royalty fee might be found in the
licensor's expenses that are "not definitely related to any gross income."
Proposed section 1.861-8(c)(2) provides that such deductions (ex-
penses) "must be apportioned ratably between statutory groupings,"
and the apportioned share to each grouping "shall be equal to the same
proportion of the deduction which the amount of gross income in the
statutory grouping bears to the total amount or gross income." Section
1.861-8(e)(9) lists examples of deductions not definitely related to any
gross income, including such things as charitable contributions and
general expenses incurred in dealing with shareholders.7 9 While such
expenses are clearly not connected with producing royalty income, they
are not connected with any other income either, and so their deduc-
tions are ratably apportioned.
77. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(6) covers income taxes specifically. Section 164 of
the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for certain taxes paid or accrued during
the taxable year.
78. See, e.g., note 67 supra. Because of the "gross-up" phenomenon, the licensee cannot
simply pay the licensor's tax bill, at least where the licensor is in the United States. This
would increase the licensor's gross income and subject him to a higher tax, reflecting the
amount of the first tax payment, which it effectively received as additional consideration
for the license. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
79. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(9):
Deductions which are not definitely related.-Deductions which shall generally be
considered as not definitely related to any gross income, and therefore are
ratably apportioned as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, are-
(i) The deduction for interest allowed only by section 163,
(ii) The deduction allowed by section 164 for real estate taxes on a personal
residence or for sales tax on the purchase of items for personal use,
(iii) The deduction for medical expenses allowed by section 233,
(iv) The deduction for charitable contributions allowed by section 170 (but
see paragraph (1) of this section in the case of a nonresident alien or foreign
corporation engaged in a trade or business in the United States),
(v) The deduction for alimony payments allowed by section 215, and
(vi) The deductions of a corporation for expenses in connection with the
issuance of its stock, the preparation of its annual report, or the annual
meeting of its shareholders, or otherwise related to its relationship with its
shareholders. ...
Note that some of these deductions are only available to individual taxpayers.
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Deductions which are "supportive in nature" (overhead, general or
administrative costs, etc.) offer a fourth component in building a high
royalty charge. Any overhead or administrative expenses incurred in
obtaining and maintaining a licensing contract are clearly deductions
allocable and apportionable to the income from the license.80 In this
connection, the "related services" that accompany license rights may be
important, since the cost of delivering these services might be relatively
easy to identify and to attribute to the royalty. Even after a taxpayer
has allocated its supportive expenses to various specific classes of
income, there may be "residual" supportive costs which can be attrib-
uted to "all gross income" as a class. 8' These deductible costs the
taxpayer can freely apportion among statutory groupings, as long as
the method used "reflects to a reasonably close extent the factual
relationship between the deduction and the gross income.' ' 82 Where
income is of "disparate types" (such as royalty income and sales in-
come), it is "generally improper to apportion deductions by comparing
amounts of gross income .... ,"83 It appears difficult, however, to find
another means of apportionment that would be acceptable, because any
supportive expenses that are genuinely related to the royalty income
can be attributed to that income as a class, and the "residual" suppor-
tive costs would not include them.8 4 Nonetheless, the "support" ele-
ment in calculating a royalty charge may be significant where the
licensor can account for supportive expenses that relate to the license.
A fifth possible means of justifying high royalty rates is with an
"interest'element." Regulation 1.861-8(e)(2) provides that interest is to
be considered allocable to all gross income as a class, since loans, even
80. Under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(c)(1)(v), apportionment is permissible based on
"[c]omparison of expenses incurred, assets used, salaries paid, space utilized, and time
spent which are attributable to activities or properties giving rise to the class of gross
income.... The "class of gross income" is simply income from the sale of licenses. This
"apportionment" reasoning is valid for the "allocation" of these costs to royalty income as
a specific class. See note 64 supra.
81. This possibility is described in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(b)(3).
82. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(c)(1).
83. Id. Note that the language used is "generally improper." An exception is expenses
that are "not definitely related to any gross income." See note 79 supra and accompanying
text. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(c)(2) requires this exception in its language that such
deductions "must be apportioned ratably" and that the portions "shall be equal to the
same proportion of the deduction which the amount of gross income in the statutory
grouping bears to the total amount of gross income." (Emphasis added)
84. In other words, the specific supportive expenses related to the royalty are allocated
to the class of "royalty income," and not to the class of "all gross income." The portion of
supportive expenses attributable to royalties is entirely accounted for at the allocation
level; none of the "residual" or general costs allocable to "all gross income" can be
apportioned to royalty income. See note 64 supra.
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where used for specific income-producing activities, free other funds
for other uses. Regulation section 1.861-8(e)(2)(v), however, stipulates
that the interest deduction should not be apportioned on the basis of
gross income, but on the basis of the amounts of capital invested in
various income-producing activities. 85 Since it is highly unlikely that a
licensor would have much, if any, capital invested in pursuit of royalty
income, 86 this "interest element" is probably not very useful.
Finally, a "profit element" can be added. Any "arm's-length" dealing
to establish a royalty charge would probably result in the inclusion of
some margin of profit for the licensor above his theoretical cost-
recovery level. How wide the profit margin should be is open to
question, but some increase in the royalty charge for a profit element
seems reasonable.8 7
85. See the example in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(2)(vi).
86. The relevant question here is how much capital is invested in producing intangibles
that might be licensed, and how that amount compares with capital invested in other
areas. Because section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the option, most
taxpayers deduct "R & D" expenses currently rather than amortizing them. As a result,
"R & D" costs.are not "capital invested." The fact that the intangible produced is a capital
asset is not relevant because in the hands of its producer it is not investment capital, but
rather similar to inventory.
87. By way of summary, suppose that in the example in note 67 supra, S were a
foreign-based global corporation with P a wholly-owned subsidiary in the United States.
Assume that the sales breakdown is the same, but that S owns the intangible property
rights, which are licensed to P in the United States. Because the U.S. market is where
three-fourths of the sales of X occur, assume that, of S's overhead and administrative
costs, $30,000 is spent directly in support of the U.S. operation (services related to the
royalty). Also assume that S has $10,000 of expenses not definitely related to any gross
income (shareholder expenses, charitable contributions, annual report costs). Assume
that S now carries on "R & D."
IfS wishes to use a royalty transfer price to shift funds out of the United States, it can
meet the arm's length test of Section 482 by using the principles underlying the Prop.
Treas. Regs. § 1.861-8. Its justifiable royalty charge could be as high as $121,635,
comprised of:
A) "R & D" expense apportioned on the basis of unit sales (three-fourths apportioned
to the royalty):
60,000 (R&D) x 750,000 (US units sold) = 45,0001,000,000 (total units sold)
B) Expenses not definitely related to any gross income, apportioned based on gross
income from the royalty in proportion to all gross income:
10,000 X 121,635 (royalty income) - 3,273121,635 (royalty) + 250,000 (S's sales)
C) Supportive expenses directly related to the royalty and service fees for the supervi-
sion of U.S. operations: 30,000.
D) A modest profit margin of 5% above recovery of cost (i.e. A + B + C):
.05 x (45,000 + 3,273 + 30,000) = 3,914
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Proposed Treasury Regulation 1.861-8
C. SUMMARY
The logic of proposed Treasury Regulation 1.861-8 offers a licensor
several possibilities for boosting royalty prices. It legitimizes the use of
royalties to set off a potentially large portion of research and develop-
ment expenses, based on the licensee's unit sales compared with the
total worldwide unit sales. Since the value of license rights usually
results directly from research and development, this set-off seems
reasonable."'
Within the reasoning of basing royalty rates on portions of deduc-
tions attributable to royalty income, there is room for adding to this "R
& D" element substantially. The end result is a package of justifications
for a licensor who wishes to transfer extra funds out of the licensee's
books.
CONCLUSION
The proposed Treasury Regulation 1.861-8 suggests a method for cal-
culating royalty rates based on expenses of the licensor.8 9 The method
can be used to justify a safe-haven minimal level for royalty payments
that are subject to review under I.R.C. section 482. Because the
application of section 482 has been difficult, and well-defined standards
for arm's length pricing have been lacking, the regulation may provide
a welcome degree of predictability in the enforcement of section 482 in
cases where royalty rates are relatively high.
On the other hand, this analysis may cast doubt on the soundness of
E) A tax element which leaves enough after-tax income to total A + B + C + D:
.48 x (45,000 + 3,273 + 30,000 + 3,914) = 39,450
The total royalty is A + B + C + D + E:
45,000 + 3,273 + 30,000 + 3,914 + 39,450 = 121,637
$121,637 is rounded off to $121,635.
88. Not surprisingly, corporate executives and their attorneys have disagreed with the
view that the set-off is reasonable. See The Numbers Game: Bringing Home the (Tax) Bacon,
FORBES, Dec. 1, 1974, at 66. Compare, TIA Analysis Supports IRS Authority for Deduction
Allocation Rules, supra note 72.
89. It seems unlikely that the IRS would use this method to impose high royalties on
U.S. licensors, because this would substantially alter current section 482 practices. In the
original example, note 67 supra, the justified royalty charge, based on an "R&D" element
alone, was $40,000 on foreign sales of $250,000-a 16 percent royalty. IRS enforcement
practices indicate that royalties of 4-5 percent are usually accepted. M. DUERR, supra note
30, at 36-37, 49.
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proposed 1.861-8 and the allocation principles outlined therein. From
the point of view of a foreign-based multinational corporation, regula-
tion 1.861-8 provides several justifications for charging high royalty
rates to affiliates in the United States. Since it is unlikely that the IRS
would object to royalty charges that are lower than the suggested
safe-haven area, the foreign licensor is left with a flexible means for
shifting funds into and out of the United States. In the long run, the
benefits of the proposed regulation may not be worth the cost of
allowing such flexibility.
As foreign direct investment in the United States increases, the U.S.
will have to deal increasingly with foreign multinational corporations
which have affiliates here. In trying to prevent artificial transfers of
funds -out of the United States, section 482 is a powerful and poten-
tially effective tool. But adoption of proposed regulation 1.861-8 may
leave, in the area of royalty pricing, a loophole for foreign multination-
als that the IRS will not be able to close.
Gary P. Stevens
